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QUINTAVALLE: THE QUANDARY IN BIOETHICS
Lisa Cherkassky*
I. INTRODUCTION
The case of R. (Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation Embryology Authority (and Secretary of
State for Health) [2005] 2 A.C. 5611 (“Quintavalle”)  presents a handful of legal problems.
The provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended, the “1990
Act”)2 were interpreted very widely to allow a mother to select embryos for implantation
according to her tissue-match preferences. This right is now enshrined into law:
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008
Schedule 2: Activities that may be licenced under the 1990 Act.
Paragraph 1ZA(1): A licence…cannot authorise the testing of an embryo, except for
one or more of the following purposes:
(d) in a case where a person (“the sibling”) who is the child of the persons
whose gametes are used to bring about the creation of the embryo (or of either
of those persons) suffers from a serious medical  condition which could be
treated by umbilical cord blood stem cells, bone marrow or other tissue of any
resulting child, establishing whether the tissue of any resulting child would be
compatible with that of the sibling.3
The biggest legal query to arise from the case is the inevitable harvest of babies, toddlers and
very young children for their bone marrow. This non-therapeutic procedure has never been
authorised by the courts and the welfare test under section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989
would no doubt require some form of physical or psychological benefit to the donor child
(which is not easy to prove in a baby or a toddler).4 There is an additional ethical problem in
that embryos can now be created specifically for the purposes of harvest. There is nothing
new in conceiving children to meet the desires of their parents (e.g. to take over the family
business,  to  keep  the  older  sibling  company,  etc.)  but  the  screening technology was  not
designed  to  create  embryos  specifically  for  participation  in  non-therapeutic  medical
procedures  after  birth.  In  addition,  the  1990  Act  was  composed  strictly  in  light  of  its
controversial nature but its wide interpretation by the lords surprised many, and what of the
embryos that do not provide a tissue match? There is an embryo wastage issue that was not
addressed by the lords despite embryos enjoying a good deal of protection in law.5
1* Senior Lecturer in Law, The University of Derby, United Kingdom.
 R (Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation Embryology Authority (and Secretary of State for Health), [2005] 2 A.C.
561 (H.L.).
2 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.).  
3 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22, § 11, sch. 2 (Eng.).
4 The Human Tissue Act 2004 allows for the storage and use of materials from children under section 2, but not 
removal. This is left to the common law. Human Tissue Act, 2004, c. 30 (Eng.).
5 Embryos created during fertility treatment only tend to be frozen for future use when the couple are genuinely 
struggling to conceive, leading to an increased wastage of healthy embryos. Human Tissue Act, 2004, c. 30 
(Eng.).
This article unpacks the judicial story behind Quintavalle  to reveal how the strict provisions
of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 - namely ‘suitable condition’ under
schedule 2 paragraph 1(1)(a) and ‘treatment services’ and ‘assisting’ under section 2(1) - were
widely  misinterpreted  to  introduce  the  social  selection  of  embryos  into  law.6 The  legal
loopholes created by the judgment (embryo wastage, welfare, eugenics and the legality of
child harvest in particular) are also identified. It will be concluded that screening for a tissue
match is social selection despite arguments to the contrary and that parents are not yet entitled
in law to harvest  a very young child for bone marrow, making the creation of a saviour
sibling under the 1990 Act as a result of Quintavalle ultimately futile.
II. THE NEED FOR A SAVIOUR SIBLING
The judgment in Quintavalle came about as a result of the swift technological developments
in fertility treatment. Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) was developing during the
eighties to screen embryos created for genetic diseases.7 The early embryo is biopsied (i.e.
one or two cells are removed) and examined for the presence of x-linked genetic diseases.
The  first  live  birth  occurred  in  1990.8 The  breakthrough  was  heralded  as  an  end  to  the
stressful combination of fertility treatment and abortion due to defective embryos.9 PGD has
now developed to detect non-gender related genetic diseases and more recently, late-onset
adult  diseases such as cancer.10 Screening for a  Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) tissue
match was added to the process to allow parents to find a cure for an existing child (often
referred to as Preimplantation Tissue Typing or PTT).11 Adam Nash became the first ever
tissue matched sibling to be born in Chicago, USA in 2001 when his umbilical cord blood
cured his sister of the autosomal recessive disorder fanconi anaemia.12 Dr Yury Verlinsky
explained the advantages of the treatment in his project report:
These  new  indications  make  PGD  a  genuine  alternative  to  conventional  prenatal
diagnosis, providing patients with important prospects not only to avoid an inherited
risk without facing termination of pregnancy, but also to establish a pregnancy with
particular genetic parameters that benefit an affected member of the family.13
The  introduction  of  Preimplantation  Tissue  Typing  (PTT)14 changed  everything.  Fertility
treatment was no longer a means to conceive a healthy baby, it was an opportunity to place an
6 See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.).  
7 Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD or PIGD) in the context of international reproductive medicine, 
Medica, http://www.medica-tradefair.com/cgi-bin/md_medica/custom/pub/content.cgi?
oid=34045&lang=2&ticket=g_u_e_s_t&page_number=1 (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
8 The first successful project was published in: Handyside, A.H., Pattinson, J.K., Penketh, R.J. et al., Biopsy of 
Human Preimplantation Embryos and Sexing by DNA Amplification, 333, The Lancet, 347-9 (1989); Handyside,
A.H., Lesko, J.G., Tarin, J.J. et al., Birth of a Normal Girl After In Vitro Fertilisation and Preimplantation 
Diagnosis Testing for Cystic Fibrosis, 327(13) New Eng. J. Med. 905 (1992).
9 Daar, J.F. ART and the Search for Perfectionism: on Selecting Gender, Genes, and Gametes, 9 J. of Gender, 
Race and Justice 241, 247 (2005).
10Alan R. Thornhill & Karen Snow, Molecular Diagnostics in Preimplanation Genetic Diagnosis, J. MOL. 
DIAGN. Feb. 2002, at 12. 
11 Ilan Tur-Kaspa & Roohi Jeelani, Clinical Guidelines for IVF and PGD for HLA Matching, 30 REPROD. 
BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 115, 115 (2015). 
12 Verlinsky, Y., Rechitsky, S., Schoolcraft, W. et al., Preimplantation Diagnosis for Fanconi Anemia Combined
with HLA Matching, 285 Journal of the American Medical Association 24, 3130 (2001).
13 Id.
order for a particular baby. The academic commentary was littered with concerns about sex
selection and eugenics (such as perfect pitch or intelligence)15 but no such ‘master race’ has
emerged  despite  PGD/PTT being  largely  unregulated  in  the  United  States.16 The  United
Kingdom was due to jump on the bandwagon, and the one thing it can do better than any
other country is regulate.
III. MR & MRS HASHMI AND THE HIGH COURT17
Mr.  and Mrs. Hashmi in the United Kingdom learnt of the breakthrough in Chicago, USA.18
Their son Zain, the fourth of five children, was suffering from beta thalassemia major and
required a daily combination of drugs and regular blood transfusions.19 A stem cell transplant
from umbilical cord blood or bone marrow was his only chance of a cure.20 Mrs Hashmi
already had three non-compatible children older than Zain, had conceived after Zain for a
matching sibling but on finding out it was not a match underwent an abortion, and gave birth
to another child who was not a tissue match before she asked the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority (HFE Authority) to issue a licence for a course of PTT to create a
match for Zain.21 The HFE Authority announced its historic decision to licence PTT in a press
release as long as any embryo created for the purpose of providing cord blood would itself be
at risk from the same disorder:
2001 Policy:
(a)  the  condition  of  the  affected  child  should  be  severe  or  life-threatening,  of  a
sufficient seriousness to justify the use of PGD;
(b) the embryos conceived in the course of this treatment should themselves be at risk
from the condition by which the existing child is affected;
(c)  all  other  possibilities  of  treatment  and sources  of  tissue for  the  affected child
should have been explored;22
14 HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, Pre-implantation Tissue Typing (‘Saviour Siblings’),
available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/preimplantation-tissue-typing.html. 
15 The following articles address the issue of eugenics: Caplan, A.L. What is Immoral About Eugenics?, 319 
British Medical Journal 1284 (1999); Robertson, J.A., Extending Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Medical 
and Non-Medical Uses, 29 Journal of Medical Ethics 213 (2003) Extending Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis:
The Ethical Debate, 18 Human Reproduction 3, 465-471 (2003) and Wilkinson, S. Eugenics, Embryo Selection, 
and the Equal Value Principle, 1 Clinical Ethics 46 (2006).
16 The U.S. does not regulate the area because it is considered ‘research’ but the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine has published some non-binding recommendations: http://www.asrm.org/?vs=1. 
17 For a briefer commentary on Quintavalle see See Cherkassky, L., The Wrong Harvest: The Law on Saviour 
Siblings, 1 The International Journal of Law, Policy and Family, 1 (2015).
18 R (Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation Embryology Authority (and Secretary of State for Health), [2005] 2 
A.C. 561 (H.L.) 5.
19 Id. at 2.
20Id. 
21 Id. at 3, 8. 
22 A transplant from an HLA identical sibling is associated with a much higher success rate than a transplant 
from alternative donors. Humans inherit half of their HLA type from their mother and the other half from their 
father, so each sibling has a one in four chance of being HLA identical to one of his siblings. See Devolder, K., 
Pre-implantation HLA Typing: Having Children to Save Our Loved Ones, 31 Journal of Medical Ethics 582 
(2005).
(d)  the technique should not  be available  where the intended tissue recipient  is  a
parent;
(e) the intention should be to take only blood for the purposes of the treatment, and
not other tissues or organs;
(f)  appropriate  implications  counselling  should  be  a  requirement  for  couples
undergoing this type of treatment;
(g) families should be encouraged to participate in follow up studies and, as with
PGD, clinics  should provide detailed information about treatment cycles and their
outcomes;
(h) embryos should not be genetically modified to provide a tissue match.23
A licence was granted to Park Hospital in Nottingham.24 Mr and Mrs Hashmi created a total
of 25 embryos in two cycles.25 The interest group Comment on Reproductive Ethics (CORE)
sought permission to apply for a judicial review on the grounds that the HFE Authority had
acted ultra vires to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, presenting a unique
opportunity for the courts to discuss the creation of saviour siblings.26 The relevant provisions
from the 1990 Act are as follows:
Section 2(1):  In this act,  “treatment services” means medical,  surgical or obstetric
services provided…for the purpose of assisting women to carry children.
Section 11(1)(a): The Authority may grant licences under paragraph 1 of schedule 2
authorising activities in the course of treatment services.
Schedule 2.
Paragraph 1(1): A licence under this paragraph may authorise any of the following in
the course of providing treatment services:
(d) practices designed to secure that embryos are in a suitable condition to be
placed in  a  woman or  to  determine  whether  embryos  are  suitable  for  that
purpose.
Paragraph 1(3): A licence under this paragraph cannot authorise any activity unless it
appears to the Authority to be necessary or desirable for the purposes of providing
treatment services.27
The question to be answered by the High Court was whether the screening of an embryo for a
tissue preference was ‘necessary or desirable’ to ensure that it was ‘in a suitable condition’ to
be placed in a woman for it to be ‘in the course of’ treatment services. CORE argued that it
was not.28 Mr and Mrs Hashmi temporarily stopped treatment in anticipation of the judgment,
handed down in R (on the application of Josephine Quintavalle) on behalf of CORE v Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority29. Mr Justice Maurice Kay began by stating that the
case  was  only  about  statutory  interpretation  (at  paragraph  7)  which  seemed  strange
23 This is the original 2001 Policy, which can be found in the revised 2004 Policy document: Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Report: Preimplantation Tissue Typing. (2004), available at 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/PolicyReview_PreimplantationTissueReport.pdf. 
24 R (Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation Embryology Authority (and Secretary of State for Health), [2005] 2 
A.C. 561 (H.L.) 5.
25Id. 
26 The United Kingdom would have been the first developed country to legalise the creation of saviour siblings.
27 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, c. 37 (Eng.). 
28 R (on the application of Josephine Quintavalle) on behalf of CORE v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority, [2002] EWHC 2000.
considering the ethical undertones of the action,30 but CORE was successful on the grounds
that PTT did not assist women to carry children in the literal sense:
…section 2(1) expressly defines “treatment services” by reference to a single purpose
- that of “assisting women to carry children”. The sole purpose of tissue typing is to
ensure that any such child would have tissue compatibility with its older sibling. I do
not  consider  that  it  can be said to  be “necessary or desirable” for  the purpose of
assisting a woman to carry a child. The carrying of such a child after implantation
would be wholly unaffected by the tissue typing. It seems to me that the language of
the Act does not bear the strain which would be necessary to read “with particular
characteristics” into the carrying of a child.31
Mr Justice Maurice Kay was of the opinion that a tissue match to a sibling was not necessary
or desirable to assist a woman in carrying a child because the phrases ‘assisting’, ‘carrying’
and ‘treatment service’ under the 1990 Act had medical connotations. A tissue match was not
a treatment service because it was merely a social characteristic that was highly subjective to
the parents. Lord Wilberforce in a much earlier case named Royal College of Nursing of the
United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Securitystated that the role of the courts
when interpreting a statute was to focus on the intentions of Parliament:
When a new state of affairs,  or a fresh set of facts  bearing on policy,  comes into
existence,  the  courts  have  to  consider  whether  they  fall  within  the  Parliamentary
intention. The courts should be less willing to extend expressed meanings if it is clear
that the Act in question was designed to be restrictive or circumscribed in its operation
rather than liberal or permissive. [The courts] cannot fill gaps; they cannot by asking
the question ‘What would Parliament have done in this current case – not being one in
contemplation – if the facts had been before it?’ attempt themselves to supply the
answer, if the answer is not to be found in the terms of the Act itself.32
Lord Bingham in the more recent case of  R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health
stated clearly that the 1990 Act was intended to be strict in nature:
It  is,  however,  plain that while Parliament outlawed certain grotesque possibilities
(such as placing a live animal embryo in a woman or a live human embryo in an
animal) it otherwise opted for a strict regime of control. No activity within this field
was left unregulated. There was to be no free for all.33
The words ‘assisting’, ‘carrying’ and ‘treatment services’ under section 2(1) of the 1990 Act
are therefore likely to refer to an activity that is  medically essential  to assist a woman in
carrying a child. 
29  Id.
30 The High Court has not hesitated in the past to have lengthy discussions about the social and ethical 
ramifications of a judgment. See Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 and Re A (Children) (Conjoined 
Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam. 147.
31 R (on the application of Josephine Quintavalle) on behalf of CORE v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority, [2002] EWHC 2000, Per Justice Maurice Kay, at paragraph 17.
32  [1981] A.C. 800,at page 822.
33 R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13 (unrelated to the current case but 
interpreting the same provisions) at paragraph 13.
The HFE Authority was given leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the
case raised “substantial matters of public importance in the interest of the community…[and
had] an impact on human life”.34 In other words, there were legal, social and ethical issues
that needed to be discussed and the Court of Appeal was the best place to do it.
IV. QUINTAVALLE IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
The  Court  of  Appeal  overturned  the  decision  of  the  High  Court  and  held  in  R (on the
application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health that PTT was a treatment service
for the ‘purpose of assisting women to carry children’ under section 2(1) of the 1990 Act and
what  was  more,  the  word  ‘suitable’ under  schedule  2  paragraph  1(1)(d)  was  to  be  read
subjectively according to the desires of the mother.35 
Lord Phillips MR was the first to overturn the strict interpretation of Mr Justice Maurice Kay:
My initial reaction to the meaning of “for the purpose of assisting women to carry
children”  was  the  same as  that  of  Maurice  Kay J.  The  phrase  naturally  suggests
treatment designed to assist the physical processes from fertilisation to the birth of a
child…my conclusion is that whether the PGD has the purpose of producing a child
free from genetic defects, or of producing a child with stem cells matching a sick or
dying sibling, the IVF treatment that includes the PGD constitutes ‘treatment for the
purpose of assisting women to bear children.36
Lord Phillips MR admitted that the relevant provisions appeared to be objective but then
stated that any service offered to a woman could be considered treatment for the purposes of
assisting  her  to  carry  a  child  as  long  as  PGD  was  included.37 This  is  a  frustrating
interpretation because PGD (screening for a defect) is quite different from PTT (screening for
a tissue match), and it oversimplifies the technology to place both procedures in the same
category.  Lord  Phillips  MR turned  his  attention  to  ‘suitable  condition’ under  schedule  2
paragraph 1(1)(d) and decided to interpret it subjectively:
Just as in the case of PGD screening for genetic defects, the meaning of “suitable”
falls to be determined having regard to its context. When the object of the treatment is
to enable a woman to bear a child with a tissue type that will enable stem cells to be
provided to a sick sibling an embryo will only be suitable for the purpose of being
placed within her if it will lead to the birth of a child with the tissue type in question.38
Lord Phillips MR took the phrase ‘suitable condition’ to mean suitable to the preferences of
the mother, which is strange because the wording of the provision - “practices designed to
secure that embryos are in a suitable condition to be placed in a woman” - suggests medical
viability for a successful pregnancy, not social suitability. It is unclear where this subjective
interpretation came from in light of such a strict provision, but the “object of the treatment”
could now potentially expand to include many subjective characteristics including blue eyes,
blond hair, perfect pitch, height, weight, metabolism and that old classic: sex selection. Lord
34 Id. Mr Justice Maurice Kay, at paragraphs 7 and 20.
35 [2003] EWCA Civ. 667
36 Id. at paragraphs 43 and 48.
37Id.
38 Id. at paragraph 49.
Phillips MR did address the ethical issues briefly as if realising just how far he had expanded
the ambit of the 1990 Act by stating that he preferred to leave ethics to one side:
Whether and for what purposes such a  choice should be permitted raises difficult
ethical questions. My conclusion is that Parliament has placed that choice in the hands
of the HFE Authority.39
It is submitted that Parliament did not intend to leave difficult ethical questions to the HFE
Authority. The provisions of the 1990 Act are strict in nature because the idea of embryonic
research was highly controversial when it was first introduced to the public, and it would
have been unacceptable to provide eager scientists with an opportunity to misinterpret or
manipulate the law. Embryos, for example, are not to be kept beyond fourteen days after the
development of the primitive streak under section 3(4) of the 1990 Act.40 This level of detail
does  not  suggest  a  statute  that  can be read subjectively depending on the context  of  the
woman (or scientist) seeking services, it suggests a statute that is objective and restrictive in
nature to control unethical practices.
Lord Justice Schiemann handed down a second judgment in the Court of Appeal but it did not
make any sense - he effectively deleted the ‘treatment services’ from his deliberations and
worked with what he had left:
A combination of section 2(1) and schedule 2 paragraph 1(3) reads: “A licence under
this paragraph cannot authorise any activity unless it appears to the Authority to be
necessary or  desirable  for  the purpose of  providing medical,  surgical  or obstetric
services provided to the public or a section of the public for the purpose of assisting
women  to  carry  children.”  All  parties,  faced  with  this  inelegant  amalgam,  have
proceeded on the basis that the issues before us can be resolved more easily by simply
ignoring the words which I have placed in italics. I agree that this seems the most
sensible  approach.  The primary question can thus be phrased:  Can the process in
issue lawfully appear to the Authority as necessary or desirable for the purpose of
assisting a woman to carry a child?41
In rewording the provisions in a way that was suitable for him, was Schiemann LJ attempting
to change the nature of the statute from objective/medical to subjective/social? Schiemann LJ
turned his eye to embryonic wastage, denying that it was an issue that some good embryos
would be wasted if they were not a tissue match: 
It seems to me that the creation of embryos with the knowledge that some perfectly
healthy  embryos  will  deliberately  be  allowed  to  perish  was  not  regarded  by
Parliament  as  always  unacceptable.  The  contrary  has  not  been  argued.  Allowing
embryos which do not suffer from a genetic defect to perish was also not regarded by
Parliament as always unacceptable. Again, the contrary has not been argued.42
It is strongly submitted that Parliament, when drafting the 1990 Act, actually kept a close eye
on embryonic wastage as a result of the Warnock report (1984) which requested that “the
39 Id. a t paragraph 50.
40 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, (Eng.).  
41 R (on the application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] EWCA Civ 667 at paragraphs 74,
75 and 76. Emphasis in original.
42 Id. at paragraphs 81 and 83.
embryo of the human species should be afforded some protection in law”.43 There are three
references to embryo destruction under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990:
section 3(4) demands the destruction of the embryo following the emergence of the primitive
streak, and section 4A(4)(b) of schedule 3 states that an embryo must be destroyed if consent
to storage is withdrawn, and section 13(5) refers to the welfare of the child “to be born”
(more  below).  The  Abortion  Act  1967,  on  a  separate  note,  does  not  allow  the  social
destruction of a pregnancy beyond twenty-four weeks because the unborn baby is close to
viable (a  provision inserted by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act  1990).  It  is
strongly submitted,  therefore,  that Parliament  wished to  limit embryonic wastage and the
1990 Act was a means to this end.
Schiemann LJ nevertheless decided that screening for a tissue match came within the ambit
of the 1990 Act:
In my judgment it was lawfully open to the Authority to come to the conclusion that
the Process in Issue would assist some women…to carry a child.44
This  was,  of  course,  an  easy  conclusion  to  reach  when  the  phrase  ‘for  the  purpose  of
providing medical services’ was conveniently deleted, giving the provisions a social context
rather than a medical one. PTT probably would assist a woman to carry a child if she is only
seeking to locate a particular social characteristic in her embryos, but PTT does not assist a
woman to carry a child if she is seeking medical assistance in carrying that child (as required
under the 1990 Act).
Schiemann LJ rounded off by inserting tissue compatibility into the suitability provision and
made one of the most contradictory comments in the whole Quintavalle story:
…the  concept  of  suitability  in  [schedule  2]  paragraph  1(1)(d)  is  wide  enough  to
embrace ensuring that the embryo does not suffer from a genetic defect and tissue
incompatibility… if the decision of the Authority is upheld in the present case it does
not  mean  that  parents  have  a  right  to  in  vitro  fertilisation  for  social  selection
purposes.45
By  reading  tissue  incompatibility  into  the  ‘suitable  condition’ provision,  Schiemann  LJ
declared that an embryo was unsuitable simply because it did not match its sibling. This was
a highly controversial conclusion to draw because it inserted social selection into the 1990
Act as a new ground for embryo destruction. It also contradicted his final statement on social
selection being inaccessible to parents. Parents now do have a right to in vitro fertilisation for
social purposes because references to medical treatment were removed from his interpretation
of the law and he added tissue incompatibility to the meaning of ‘suitability’ under schedule 2
paragraph 1(1)(d). Schiemann LJ was denying the very “right” he had just granted.
Mance  LJ  handed  down  the  most  interesting  judgment  in  the  Court  of  Appeal,  but
inadvertently caused the most confusion. Firstly he addressed the welfare provision under
43 Warnock Report, Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & SOC. SEC, July 1984, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, at paragraph 11.17, 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/2068.html (last accessed 8th February 2016).
44 Id., at paragraph 89.
45 R (on the application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] EWCA Civ 667at paragraphs 96 
and 98.
section 13(5) of the 1990 Act and decided that creating a sibling for the benefit of another
sibling was not against the welfare of the child to be born:
Whilst that subsection probably had primarily in mind consideration of any adverse
effects  on  the  welfare  of  the  future  or  any  existing  child,  the  language  does  not
exclude positive effects.46
The full text of the welfare provision reads as follows: 
Section 13(5): A woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless account
has  been  taken  of  the  welfare  of  any  child  who may  be  born  as  a  result  of  the
treatment (including the need of that child for supportive parenting), and of any other
child who may be affected by the birth.47
It is a concern that the welfare provision can be so easily reversed to support the creation of
an embryo for its blood and bone marrow. Mance LJ may have read the welfare provision in a
way that supported the child to be cured.48
Mance LJ moved on to address the most glaring ethical issue: eugenics.  He admitted that
there is a difference between screening out abnormalities and screening in preferences but he
denied that the Hashmi family had a choice:
The crucial distinction has been put as being between “screening out abnormalities”
and  “screening  in  preferences”.  That  distinction  raises  a  spectre  of  eugenics  and
“designer babies”.  But it  is a crude over-simplification to view this case as being
about “preferences”. The word suggests personal indulgence or predilection and the
luxury of a real choice. But there is no element of whim in the circumstances that the
HFE Authority had it in mind to licence in December 2001, and Mr and Mrs Hashmi
are  not  seeking  to  indulge  themselves.  The  case  is  about  a  family’s  reaction,
understandable in the light of current scientific possibilities, to a cruel fate which one
of its members is suffering and will continue to suffer, without a successful stem cell
transplant.49
Mance LJ added that the facts in the Hashmi case were anything but “purely social”:
There are here good medical reasons for screening any embryo, although they do not
relate to any future child’s health. The concerns to which the HFEA’s decision and the
licence for Mr and Mrs Hashmi are directed are anything but “purely social”, relating
as they do to the health of a sibling and the wellbeing of the whole family. What
matters in any event is that the Warnock committee proposed in Chap. 9.11 of its
report to leave even the general question of the acceptability of sex selection to the
authority  which it  recommended should be established…the present circumstances
involve a form of selection which is much less obviously problematic than, and very
far removed from, selection for social purposes.50
46 Id. at paragraph 133.
47 Id.
48 There is a feeling amongst writers that the welfare provision under section 13(5) is not effective anyway 
because no one can enforce it: see Jackson, E., Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle, 65 
MOD. L. REV., 176,176 (2002), and Cherkassky, L., The Wrong Harvest: The Law on Saviour Siblings, 1 The 
International Journal of Law, Policy and Family, 1 (2015)..
49 R (on the application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] EWCA Civ 667at paragraph 134.
50 Id. at paragraphs 135 and 143. Emphasis added.
There  are  two  quotes  above  that  cause  confusion.  Firstly,  Mance  LJ  was  clearly  of  the
opinion that screening in preferences was acceptable because Mr and Mrs Hashmi were not
merely “indulging in luxury” but sought to protect the “wellbeing of the whole family”, but it
is submitted that using the technology to locate an embryo for a particular characteristic is an
indulgence and it  is a luxury. An expensive one. The “cruel fate” and “suffering” bestowed
upon their existing child does not turn the voluntary use of the technology into a necessity. It
is not a treatment service to assist the carriage of a child in the medical sense under section
2(1) of the 1990 Act.  Secondly, Mance LJ admitted that screening in preferences did not
relate to the health of the embryo, but he still denied that it was a “purely social” use of the
technology. In light of the subsequent ban on sex selection for social purposes under schedule
2 paragraph 1ZB of the 1990 Act which states: 
…a licence cannot authorise any practice designed to secure that a resulting child will
be of one sex rather than the other, unless there is a particular risk that a woman will
give birth to a child who will develop a gender-related physical or mental disability or
disease…
it is likely that Parliament did not intend for embryos to be selected or destroyed on any
ground other than medical reasons.51
Mance  LJ  turned  his  attention  to  the  definition  of  ‘treatment  services’ and  decided  that
screening in a tissue preference could constitute such a service under section 2(1): 
…once it  is  recognised  that  the  concept  of  “services  for  the  purpose  of  assisting
women to  carry  children”  extends  beyond  purely  physical  problems  affecting  the
viability  of  the  embryo  during  pregnancy  and  birth…it  becomes  clear  that  such
services may have regard to prospective parents’ and society’s concern for others and
for the future. The concept is in other words to be read in a general, rather than a
restrictive sense…I have further concluded that a biopsy for the purpose of tissue
typing and of  enabling  a  choice  to  be made regarding implantation  based on the
compatibility of the embryo’s tissue with that of a sibling is capable of constituting a
service for the purpose of assisting women to carry children.52
This definition of ‘treatment services’ was rather puzzling because section 2(1) clearly states: 
In this act, “treatment services” means medical, surgical or obstetric services provided
for the purpose of assisting women to carry children.
Mance LJ disposed of the words ‘medical, surgical or obstetric’ and replaced them with social
preferences. Parliament did not intend for section 2(1) to be read in a wider social context
because it very clearly defines “treatment services” as medical, surgical or obstetric services
which  do not  extend beyond the  “purely physical  problems affecting the  viability  of  the
embryo”  (as  per  Mance  LJ).  Therefore,  as  a  result  of  Mance  LJ  interpreting  treatment
services as a wider social service, the screening in of a tissue preference is confirmed as
social selection. 
51 Confusingly, the screening in of preferences was frequently c ompared to sex selection (a well-known 
method of social selection) throughout the Court of Appeal judgment R (on the application of Josephine 
Quintavalle) on behalf of CORE v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, [2002] EWHC 2000, at 
paragraphs 27, 124, 135, 140 and 143.
52 Id. at paragraphs 142 and 145.
The Court of Appeal was clearly content to widen the scope of the 1990 Act to allow the HFE
Authority to authorise PTT as an activity in the course of treatment services for the purpose
of assisting women to carry children under section 2(1). The suitable condition of the embryo
under schedule 2 paragraph 1(1)(d) was given a wider social meaning to support the desires
of the mother.  She was not indulging in luxury,  she had no choice (per Mance LJ).  The
medical  connotations  were  removed  from  the  relevant  provisions  and  replaced  by  the
wellbeing of the family as a whole (per Schiemann LJ and Mance LJ). The lords effectively
placed PTT in the social selection category despite strong denials that social selection was
taking place, permitting a mother to select or destroy her healthy embryos simply because
they did or did not not match her existing child. 
Notwithstanding a Court  of Appeal  judgment beset with confusion and contradiction,  the
common law had changed. Mr and Mrs Hashmi restarted their PTT treatment in May 2003
but a pregnancy did not result.53 Mr and Mrs Whitaker, who had made an identical plea to the
HFE Authority at the same time as Mr and Mrs Hashmi but were rejected on the grounds that
their son’s disease diamond blackfan anaemia was sporadic rather than hereditary according
to the original PTT policy published in 2001 (above), travelled to the Chicago Reproductive
Institute which first pioneered the procedure and successfully gave birth to Jamie Whitaker in
June 2003. He was ironically heralded as “Britain’s first saviour sibling”54 but concerns were
raised that the technology was going too far by a spokesman for LIFE:
To  create  another  child  as  a  transplant  source,  however,  could  set  a  dangerous
precedent for uses of this kind of technology. How will baby James feel, for example,
when he discovers that he was brought into the world to supply ‘spare parts’ for his
elder brother?55
The HFE Authority, in light of the Whitaker development and the newly found freedom in R
(on the application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health, decided to take another
look at its PTT policy and announced two changes in 2004:
1. PTT can be offered in cases where the embryo is not at risk from the condition
affecting the existing child;
2. Depending on the needs of the existing child, it can be acceptable to offer PTT
with a view to harvesting bone marrow.56
The changes were justified by the HFE Authority on the following grounds:
Faced  with  potential  requests  from  parents  who  want  to  save  a  sick  child,  the
emotional focus is understandably on the child who is ill. Our job is also to consider
the welfare of the tissue matched child which will be born. Our review of the evidence
53 Mr and Mrs Hashmi underwent six trials of IVF with PTT and created 25 embryos, but were ultimately 
unsuccessful in establishing a pregnancy. BioNews, Hashmis Fail in ‘Saviour Sibling’ Attempt, Issue 266 (13 
July 2004), http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_12031.asp. 
54 Dobson, R. Saviour Sibling is Born After Embryo Selection in the United States, -326 BRIT. MED. J., 1416, 
1416 (2003).
55 Patrick Cusworth, LIFE charity spokesman, quoted in the article cited in fn. 33 above.
56 [2003] EWCA Civ 667; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Report: Preimplantation Tissue 
Typing. (2004). http://www.hfea.gov.uk/515.html, last accessed 8th February 2016, at paragraph 37.
does not indicate that the embryo biopsy procedure disadvantages resulting babies
compared to other IVF babies.57
The 2004 changes expanded the original 2001 policy considerably. Parents no longer needed
to screen their embryos for hereditary defects, disabilities or disorders in order to use PTT,
turning PGD/HLA into a purely subjective/social procedure. CORE was granted an appeal to
the House of Lords in 2005. It was the final opportunity for the judiciary to clear up the
following legal, social and ethical loopholes that were created by the Court of Appeal:
 the 1990 Act was designed to be interpreted in a strictly objective/medical sense; 
 the true meaning of ‘treatment service’ under section 2(1) did not include the creation
of embryos for social purposes;
 the welfare of the saviour child (not the sick child) could be offered some protection
under section 13(5) of the 1990 Act; 
 the phrase ‘suitable condition’ under schedule 2 paragraph 1(1)(d) was not subjective
and did not support the social selection of embryos;
 there was a much higher risk of embryonic wastage; 
 the introduction of social selection under the 1990 Act paved the way for eugenics in
the future;
 it  was  not  in  the  best  interests  of  a  very  young  donor  child  to  undergo  a  non-
therapeutic harvesting procedure.
It is worth noting a particularly unpleasant statement in the revised PTT Report (2004) to
demonstrate why the House of Lords judgment was so important to the welfare of the saviour
sibling:
…should the existing child relapse, there is likely to be insufficient time to go through
the process of creating a  tissue-matched sibling.  If  such a sibling existed already,
tissue that could be used in treatment would then be at hand if and when required.58
In  light  of  the  ‘commodity’ feel  to  the  newly  published  guidelines,  it  would  have  been
damaging for the House of Lords to uphold the decision of the Court of Appeal.
V. QUINTAVALLE IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS
The House of Lords upheld the decision in the Court of Appeal in R (Quintavalle) v Human
Fertilisation  and Embryology  Authority  (and Secretary  of  State  for  Health),  choosing to
bypass  matters  of  law,  harvest,  eugenics,  welfare  and ethics  to  focus  solely  on  statutory
interpretation.59 
Lord Hoffman handed down the main judgment,  starting with the difficulty presented by
‘suitability’:
The claimant [CORE] says that this gives far too wide a meaning to the notion of
being suitable. It would enable the authority to authorise a single cell biopsy to test
the embryo for whatever characteristics the mother might wish to know: whether the
child  would  be  male  or  female,  dark  or  blonde,  perhaps  even,  in  time  to  come,
57 Suzi Leather, who was the Chair of the HFE Authority at the time, 21st July 2004. The original press release 
is on the official website: www.hfea.gov.uk/763.html (last accessed 8th February 2016).
58 Id., at page 9, paragraph 34. Emphasis added.
59 2 A.C. 561 [2005].
intelligent or stupid. Suitable must therefore have a narrower meaning than suitable
for that particular mother.60
Despite the valid points raised by CORE, Lord Hoffman decided that the phrase ‘suitable
condition’ should be interpreted as widely as possible:
‘Suitable’ is one of those adjectives which leaves its content to be determined entirely
by  context…[The  Authority]  may  consider  that  allowing  the  mother  to  select  an
embryo on such grounds is undesirable on ethical or other grounds. But the breadth of
the concept of suitability is what determines the breadth of the authority’s discretion.61
Lord Hoffman was of the opinion that the HFE Authority had complete discretion over the
meaning of  ‘suitable  condition’ because  of  the  comments  in  the  Warnock Report  (1984)
regarding sex selection:
…the Warnock Report…went on to consider the use of gender identification to select
the sex of a child “for purely social reasons”…the committee said that…“the whole
question  of  the  acceptability  of  sex  selection  should  be  kept  under  review”.  The
committee  [also]  said:  “the  authority  should  be  specifically  charged  with  the
responsibility  to  regulate  and monitor  practice  in  relation  to  those  sensitive  areas
which raise fundamental ethical questions”. The conclusion which I draw is that the
committee contemplated that the authority would decide the circumstances, if any, in
which sex selection on social grounds should be authorised. As sex selection on social
grounds is the most obvious case of selecting an embryo on grounds  other than its
health, I would infer that the Warnock committee did not intend that selection of IVF
embryos on grounds which went beyond genetic abnormality should be altogether
banned.62
Lord Hoffman inadvertently stated that PTT was not connected to the health of the embryo
providing an explanation for the constant references to sex selection in both appeal courts:
they  are  clearly  both  methods  of  social  selection.  To  put  it  in  stark  terms,  if  PTT can
accurately be said  to  be an  ‘activity  in  the course of  medical/surgical/obstetric  treatment
services’ to  be  licenced  under  section  11(1)(a)  then  it  is  neither  here  nor  there  that  the
Warnock Report left sex selection - a widely known social preference - to the discretion of
the HFE Authority. Lord Hoffman then felt free to announce that ‘suitable condition’ was to
be read subjectively according to the desires of the mother:
…there was no proposal [in the White Paper: Human Fertilisation and Embryology: A
Framework for  Legislation,  November 1987 (Cm 259)]  to  include  in  the  “clearly
prohibited” list the testing of embryos to enable the mother to choose to carry a child
with characteristics of her choice…Thus, if the concept of suitability is broad enough
to include suitability for the purposes of the particular mother, it seems to me clear
enough that the activity of determining the genetic characteristics of the embryo by
way of PGD or HLA typing would be “in the course of” providing the mother with
IVF services and that the authority would be entitled to take the view that it  was
60 Id. at paragraph 13.
61 Id. at paragraph 14.
62 Id. at paragraphs 16, 17 and 19 (emphasis added).
necessary or desirable for the purpose of providing such services…the word ‘suitable’
is an empty vessel which is filled with meaning by context and background.63 
Lord Hoffman with this paragraph authorised the creation of saviour siblings in the United
Kingdom. However, it is submitted that he focused too heavily on section 11 of the 1990 Act,
which states:
Section 11(1)(a): The Authority may grant licences under paragraph 1 of schedule 2
authorising activities in the course of treatment services.
It is probably acceptable to say that PTT is an activity in the course of PGD and therefore the
HFE Authority have discretion to licence it,  but under section 2(1) treatment services are
defined  as  ‘medical,  surgical  or  obstetric’  placing  an  emphasis  on  medical  viability.
Additionally, ‘suitable condition’ under schedule 2 paragraph 1(1)(d) refers to the medical
status of the embryo (i.e. free from defect or disease), not an empty vessel to be filled by the
social  desires  of  the  mother.  Lord  Hoffman  appears  to  be  setting  some  of  the  relevant
provisions to one side in his interpretation of the law. It is highly unlikely that during the
construction of the 1990 Act Parliament wished to leave the question of whether or not to
create a baby for its social characteristics (i.e. eugenics) to the licencing authority. It is simply
too controversial.
Lord Hoffman finished his judgment on a rather strange note, concluding that should the best
interests of the potential child be in any doubt, “a ruling from the court may be obtained”.64
This was his only reference to the more pressing issue of the legitimate harvesting of young
children for their bone marrow:
I  have  no  doubt  that  medical  practitioners  take  very  seriously  the  law  that  any
operation upon a child for which there is no clinical reason relating to the child itself
must be justified as being for other reasons in the child’s best interests…The authority
is in my opinion entitled to assume that a child conceived pursuant to its licence will,
after birth, receive the full protection of the law.65
By stating that issues of welfare will  be dealt  with after birth,  Lord Hoffman moved the
ethical responsibility of creating babies for harvest away from the HFE Authority and thrust it
into welfare law (the Children Act 1989) and transplant law (the Human Tissue Act 2004).
These three areas of practice (fertility, welfare and transplant) do not sit separately - they are
intricately tied to each other as a result of Quintavalle. There is no point in helping parents to
select  embryos  with  a  tissue  preference  if  the  harvesting  procedure  after  birth  does  not
support the welfare of the child. Lord Hoffman did not address this legal loophole, preferring
instead  to  maintain  that  the  HFE  Authority  was  to  “grapple  with  such  issues”  at  its
discretion.66 The proof of this discretion, in his opinion, was the fact that Parliament excluded
sex selection from the original 1990 Act:
The authority was specifically created to make ethical distinctions and, if Parliament
should consider it to be failing in that task, it has in reserve its regulatory powers
63 Emphasis added, Id. at paragraphs 22, 24 and 33.
64 Id. at paragraphs 35 and 38.
65 Id. at paragraph 38.
66 Id. at paragraph 26. This is nonsense because the HFE Authority have nothing to do with the saviour child 
after it has been born.
under  section 3(3)(c)…Perhaps  the most  telling indication  that  parliament  did not
intend to confine the authority’s powers to unsuitability on grounds of genetic defects
is the absence of any reference in the Act to selection on grounds of sex…It is hard to
imagine  that  the  reason  why  the  Act  said  nothing  on  the  subject  was  because
Parliament  thought  it  was  clearly  prohibited  by  the  use  of  the  word  ‘suitable’ or
because  it  wanted  to  leave  the  question  over  for  later  primary  legislation.  In  my
opinion the only reasonable inference is that parliament intended to leave the matter
to the authority to decide.67
It  is submitted that Parliament did not refer to sex selection in the 1990 Act because the
provisions were already strict enough to exclude every kind of social selection. Once again,
the HFE Authority’s perceived discretion over sex selection is used to justify the inclusion of
PTT into the 1990 Act, placing both procedures into the ‘social selection’ category.
Lord Brown delivered the smaller judgment in the House of Lords and began by turning an
eye to the bigger ethical issues:
The ethical questions raised by such a process are, it need hardly be stated, profound.
Should genetic testing be used to enable a choice to be made between a number of
healthy  embryos,  a  choice  based  on  the  selection  of  certain  preferred  genetic
characteristics?...Is  this  straying  into  the  field  of  “designer  babies”  or  -  as  the
celebrated geneticist Lord Winston, has put it, “treating the offspring to be born as a
commodity”.68
It is clear that Quintavalle was not merely a case about statutory interpretation - there were
social and ethical problems to discuss too, especially the legality of the subsequent harvest
upon the donor child. However, Lord Brown quickly reigned in his enthusiasm for ethical
issues by stating that the “sole concern” of the House of Lords was merely to decide whether
the 1990 Act allowed the HFE Authority to licence tissue typing,69 and instead turned to
‘suitability’ with a supporting comment for the appellant Josephine Quintavalle: 
Initially, I confess to having found some considerable force in the claimant’s argument
that PGD screening is one thing, and properly licensable under the 1990 Act, tissue
typing a completely different concept and impermissible. It is one thing to enable a
woman to conceive and bear a child which will itself be free of genetic abnormality;
quite another to bear a child specifically selected for the purpose of treating someone
else.  One  can  read  into  the  statutory  purpose  specified  by  section  2(1),  that  of
“assisting  women  to  carry  children”,  the  notion  of  healthy  children  -  only  a
genetically  healthy  embryo being “suitable”  for  placing  in  the  woman within  the
meaning of paragraph 1(1)(d).70
Despite  this  admission that  the provisions  were strictly  objective/medical  in  nature,  Lord
Brown frustratingly turned back to  sex selection and drew strength from the fact that the
Warnock Report left sex selection “under review”:
The  [Warnock]  committee,  at  paragraph  9.11,  expressly  envisaged  the  future
possibility of sex selection “for purely social reasons” and concluded that “the whole
67 Id. at paragraphs 28 and 29.
68 Id. at paragraph 43.
69 Id. at paragraph 46.
70 Id. at paragraph 51.
question of the acceptability of sex selection should be kept under review” - review
which  inferentially  was  to  be  undertaken  by  a  proposed  new  statutory  licencing
authority established “to regulate and monitor practice in relation to those sensitive
areas which raise fundamental ethical questions” at paragraph 13.3.71 
Tissue typing had been denied on many occasions throughout the appeal courts as emulating
the social selection of embryos, including this strong statement by Lord Brown himself:
In the unlikely event that the Authority were to propose licencing genetic selection for
purely social reasons, Parliament would surely act at once to remove that possibility,
doubtless using for the purpose the regulation making power under section 3(3)(c).
Failing  that,  in  an  extreme  case  the  court’s  supervisory  jurisdiction  could  be
invoked.72
The frequent comparisons to sex selection in both appeal courts therefore gives a very strong
impression that tissue typing  is a form of social selection and the lords are having to draw
parallels between PTT and sex selection in order to justify its inclusion in the strict provisions
of the 1990 Act.
Lord  Brown  finished  his  contradictory  judgment  with  an  even  more  baffling  reason  to
authorise tissue typing:
I was at one time attracted to [the] dividing line between selection aimed purely at
eliminating serious genetic or chromosome defects (permissible) and other selective
criteria (impermissible). As, however, Lord Hoffman points out, what amounts to a
serious genetic defect will itself often be contentious.73
Lord Brown, in an attempt to authorise PTT, suggested that the line between ‘serious defects’
and ‘selective criteria’ was ambiguous. It is agreed that some defects, disabilities or diseases
are not as harmful as others (i.e. partial deafness vs. diamond blackfan anaemia), but a very
clear line can be drawn between genetic conditions and  preferred characteristics. A tissue
match to a sibling is not a genetic defect, nor does it assist a woman to carry a child in the
medical  sense,  so  is  Lord  Brown  suggesting  that  a  non-matching  embryo  is  defective,
disabled  or  diseased?  This  would  be  highly  controversial  and  could  lead  to  wasteful
embryonic destruction. Lord Brown goes further, reducing PGD to a social, as opposed to a
medical, procedure: 
PGD with a view to producing a healthy child assists a woman to carry a child only in
the sense that it helps her decide whether the embryo is “suitable” and whether she
will  bear  the child.  Whereas,  however,  suitability  is  for  the  woman,  the  limits  of
permissible embryo selection are for the authority.74
This  statement  appears  to  be  judicial  confirmation  that  suitability  is  subjective  and  that
embryos can be selected for purely social reasons. PGD was, however, developed to screen
embryos for genetic diseases as opposed to tissue match to suit the desires of the mother.
71 Id. at paragraph 53.
72 Id. at paragraph 62. Lord Hoffmann made an almost identical statement at paragraph 28.
73 Id. at paragraph 61.
74 Id. at paragraph 62.
The House of Lords were content to close their brief judgment at this point, failing to address
the legal, social and ethical and consequences of their controversial decision. 
Tissue  typing is  now a ‘treatment  service’ for  the  ‘purpose of  assisting  women to  carry
children’ under section 2(1) of the 1990 Act and what is more, the suitability of the embryos
under schedule 2 paragraph 1(1)(d) is subjective according to the desires of the mother. In
social terms, it is now possible to ‘design’ a saviour sibling by screening in a preferred tissue
match  and  destroy  any  remaining  embryos  on  the  grounds  that  they  do  not  match  this
personal preference. 
It is highly unlikely that the legitimacy of tissue typing will ever be questioned now that it is
enshrined into statute:
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008
Schedule 2: Activities that may be licenced under the 1990 Act.
Paragraph 1ZA(1): A licence…cannot authorise the testing of an embryo, except for
one or more of the following purposes:
(d) in a case where a person (“the sibling”) who is the child of the persons
whose gametes are used to bring about the creation of the embryo (or of either
of those persons) suffers from a serious medical  condition which could be
treated by umbilical cord blood stem cells, bone marrow or other tissue of any
resulting child, establishing whether the tissue of any resulting child would be
compatible with that of the sibling.
As a result of the judgment in Quintavalle, embryos created to save a sibling are now stuck in
even more legal loopholes: 
 on what ground can the appeal courts justify the change in character of the 1990 Act
from objective/medical to subjective/social despite its strict provisions?
 is it acceptable to destroy embryos for their social characteristics when there are legal
provisions in place to offer protection to embryos? 
 how does the screening in of a social preference constitute an activity in the course of
medical, surgical or obstetric treatment services under section 2(1) of the 1990 Act? 
 on what grounds can ‘suitable condition’ to ‘assist’ a woman to carry a child under
schedule 2 paragraph 1(1)(d) be read to support the social selection of embryos?
 does the welfare test under section 13(5) protect an embryo from being destroyed for
social purposes, or from being selected for harvesting purposes, or both? Or neither? 
 on what grounds can the HFE Authority exercise such sweeping ethical discretion? 
 why do the lords deny that screening in preferences constitutes the social selection of
embryos when the liberal attitude towards sex selection in the Warnock Report (1984)
formed the basis for their decision to incorporate PTT into the 1990 Act? 
 has the inclusion of social selection under the 1990 Act paved the way for eugenics in
the future?
 can the matching sibling, once born, be legally harvested for its bone marrow under
the Human Tissue Act 2004?
The Court  of Appeal  and the House of Lords had the opportunity to  address these legal
loopholes but instead reverted responsibility back to the HFE Authority.75
75 There are examples of the House of Lords refusing to discuss the ethical issues at paragraphs 20, 26, 29, 39, 
46, 48, 55, 56 and 58 of the judgment.
The biggest concern is the legitimacy of the bone marrow harvest upon the donor child once
born. This unique non-therapeutic procedure has not yet been authorised by the courts and the
lords did not further investigate the welfare of the donor child. The saviour sibling could well
be ‘unusable’ until she is much older and able to consent for herself, by which time it may be
too late.76
VI. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE AFTER QUINTAVALLE
Looking at the Quintavalle story as a whole, it appears that both appeal courts placed tissue
typing in the same category as sex selection to confirm that the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority does have discretion to licence PTT as an activity in the course of
treatment services under s.11(1)(a) of the 1990 Act.  The House of Lords attached to this
decision a guarantee that should the HFE Authority ever authorise the selection of embryos
for ‘purely social reasons’ the legislature would act immediately to shut the practice down (at
paragraphs 28 and 62). This is a remarkable contradiction. PTT is clearly a method of social
selection, so why was its social nature denied?
The welfare loophole is just as confusing. The 1990 Act contains a welfare provision under
section 13(5) but the prospective child (according to Lord Hoffman) is protected by law after
birth under the Children Act 1989, leaving the Human Tissue Authority to bear the brunt of
the ethical issues of harvesting very young donors.
Embryonic wastage was not addressed in any detail by the lords, despite the mother now
being able to destroy healthy embryos simply because they do not match a sibling. Embryos
are protected from harm and wasteful destruction under section 3(4), section 4A(4)(b) and
section 13(5) of the 1990 Act and section 1(1)(a)  of the Abortion Act  1967.  Quintavalle
inadvertently created a new and unregulated ground upon which to socially destroy healthy
embryos.  The biggest legal loophole of all, however, is the legitimacy of harvesting a baby,
toddler or young child for her bone marrow. What  is  the current  legal position should a
couple come forward and ask for a saviour sibling? 
The  only  saviour  sibling  authority  in  the  UK  is  Re  Y  (Mental  Patient:  Bone  Marrow
Donation)77 and it uses the interfamilial principle to justify a bone marrow harvest upon an
incompetent adult.78 This would not be appropriate for children, whose needs are paramount
under section 1(3) of the Children Act 198979.  Re Y was underpinned by the US case of
Curran v Bosze (1990) which stated that for bone marrow harvests upon children there must
be an ‘existing relationship’ between siblings: 
The psychological benefit is grounded firmly in the fact that the donor and recipient
are  known  to  each  other  as  family.  Only  where  there  is  an  existing  relationship
between a healthy child and his or her ill sister or brother may a psychological benefit
to the child from donating bone marrow to a sibling realistically be found to exist.80
76 The Human Tissue Authority have jurisdiction over this matter which is outside the ambit of this article, but 
it is the next issue to be explored by the author.
77 [1997] Fam. 110.
78 Id. Per Connell J, at pages 115-116.
79 Children Act 1989 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/41/contents. 
80 566 N.E.2d 1319 Per Calvo J, at pages 1343-4.
Calvo  J  was  also  of  the  opinion  that  it  could  be  as  much  as  twenty  years  before  the
psychological benefits of a bone marrow donation are felt by a donor child,81 and the benefit
was not to be “one of personal, individual altruism in an abstract, theoretical sense”.82 He also
suggested that the benefit should be present  at the time of the harvest - not in the future to
retrospectively justify the harvest - because intention could not be supplied after the fact.83
Additionally, the age of the minor was important to the validity of the procedure in law:
[It is] not possible to discover the child’s likely treatment/non-treatment preferences
by examining the child’s philosophical, religious and moral views, life goals, values
about the purpose of life and the way it should be lived, and attitudes toward sickness,
medical procedures, suffering and death…at the age of three and a half.84
The notion that a psychological benefit must be tangible and proven at the time of the non-
therapeutic procedure is supported by Butler-Sloss LJ in Re A (Male Sterilisation):
In my judgment best interests encompasses medical, emotional and all other welfare
issues…An operation to sterilise has to be demonstrated to be in the best interests of
the person unable to consent. The case has to be proved.85
In addition to Curran v Bosze and Re A, there are other medical cases that support the welfare
of the donor child. For example, the plight of the saviour sibling cannot be balanced against
the plight  of the sick sibling unless  both siblings are  warded at  the same time,  this  was
confirmed  in  Court  of  Appeal [1993]  and  Birmingham  City  Council  v  H  (A  Minor).86
Additionally, the consent of the parents to the non-therapeutic procedure is not decisive.87,
The parents can also not subsume the rights of the saviour child into their own to control her
medical care.88
Therefore, without absolute proof that the  saviour child (not the wider family or the sick
child)  will  experience  a  tangible  psychological  benefit  at  the  time  of  the  harvest,  the
procedure is not legitimate in law. It would be a trespass to her person and would not serve
her best interests. Balancing acts, substituted judgments, parental consent and retrospective
benefits do not validate the procedure. Parents may be free in fertility law to create their own
saviour sibling, but it does not mean that the sibling can be harvested after birth.89 The lords
in Quintavalle should have addressed this matter.
VII. CONCLUSION
81 Id. at page 1335. 
82 Id. at page 1343
83 Id. at page 1336.
84 Id. Per Calvo J at pages 1343, 1344, 1319, 1326 and 1336. Bosze (the father) argued in response that if the 
sick sibling was kept alive, the donor children (twins) would have the opportunity to get to know him. This 
speculative future benefit did not hold any weight in court. The sick sibling eventually died of leukaemia.
85 [2000] 1 F.L.R. 549, at page 555. Emphasis added.
86 [Court of Appeal [1993] 1 FLR 883 and Birmingham City Council v H (A Minor) [1994] 2 AC 212]
87 as seen in Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421, Re K.D. (A Minor) (Ward: 
Termination of Access) [1988] A.C. 806, Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam. 33, Re E 
(A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] 2 FCR 219, Re Z (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) 
[1997] Fam. 1 and Wyatt v Portsmouth Hospital NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 1811.
88  Re C (A Child) (HIV Test) [2000] Fam. 48. 
89 For a rigorous examination of welfare law in the context of donor children, see Cherkassky L., Children and 
the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, Medical Law International, (2015), vol. 1, 1-23.
R  (Quintavalle introduced  the  social  selection  of  embryos  into  law  on  contradictory
grounds.90 Mr Justice Maurice Kay in the High Court interpreted the 1990 Act in a literal
sense and concluded that tissue match to a sibling was not necessary or desirable to assist a
woman in carrying a child. It is submitted that this was the correct approach in light of the
earlier  discussions in  Royal  College of  Nursing of  the United Kingdom v Department  of
Health and Social Security and  Quintavalle  that the 1990 Act was intended to be strict in
nature.91
The Court  of  Appeal  ended up raising more questions  than it  did answers,  owing to the
unexpected wide interpretation of the 1990 Act and its silence on welfare, eugenics, embryo
wastage and the lawfulness of the subsequent harvest. Phrases that caused particular concern
were those of Lord Phillips MR, who stated that ‘suitable condition’ under section 2(1) was to
refer to the purpose of the treatment, including the search for a tissue match. This idea would
have introduced widespread eugenics if the House of Lords had adopted it. Schiemann LJ
removed the phrase ‘medical treatment’ from the provisions for convenience, changing the
tone of the 1990 Act from objective/medical to subjective/social. He also (rather confusingly)
denied  that  parents  have  a  right  to  social  selection  in  the  same breath  as  he read  tissue
compatibility into ‘suitable condition’. Mance LJ removed ‘medical, surgical or obstetric’
from his interpretation of ‘treatment services’ under section 2(1) to support the plight of Mr
& Mrs Hashmi, and inadvertently accepted PGD/PTT as a social procedure when he stated
that it cared for the “wellbeing of the whole family”. He merely confused matters when he
then denied that selecting a tissue match was a “purely social” use of the technology.
In the House of Lords, Lord Hoffman focussed heavily on section 11 (the power to licence
activities), largely shelving the provisions of ‘suitability’, ‘treatment services’ and ‘assisting’
under  sections  2(1)  and  schedule  2  paragraph  1(1)(d)  of  the  1990  Act.  Suitability  was
assigned  to  the  mother  without  proper  explanation,  and  he  separated  fertility  law  from
welfare  and transplant  law by stating  that  the  saviour  child  is  protected  after  birth.  The
ambiguous handling of sex selection by the Warnock Report was also evidence, according to
Lord  Hoffman,  of  the  discretion  afforded  to  the  HFE Authority  to  licence  PTT,  but  sex
selection  for  social  reasons  is  now  explicitly  banned  by  the  reforming  2008  Act  (now
schedule  2  paragraph  1ZB  of  the  1990  Act)  leaving  this  perceived  openness  to  social
selection highly unlikely. Lord Brown focussed on sex selection and the Warnock Report too. 
In  the  end,  the  House  of  Lords  merely  raised  even  more  questions  with  its  baffling
interpretation of the law and its refusal to address any of the queries created by the Court of
Appeal.
The common law in the UK (and the US in Curran v Bosze92) makes it clear that the welfare
of the saviour sibling is paramount, and a tangible psychiatric benefit must be proven at the
time of the bone marrow harvest for the donor child to benefit from it. In babies, toddlers and
very young children, this is probably not possible.
It is concluded that only the beginning of the saviour sibling process (i.e. the selection of the
matching embryo using PTT) is lawful under schedule 2 paragraph 1ZA(1)(d) of the Human
Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Act  1990  (as  amended)  and  even  then,  the  roots  of  this
provision  are  based  on  a  confusing  misinterpretation  of  the  relevant  provisions  in
Quintavalle,  particularly  ‘suitable  condition’  under  schedule  2  paragraph  1(1)(a)  and
90 [R (Quintavalle) v Human Fertilisation Embryology Authority (and Secretary of State for Health) [2005] 2 
A.C. 561]
91 Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security [1981] A.C. 
800 and Quintavalle R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13].
92 Curran v Bosze (1990) 566 N.E.2d 1319.
‘treatment services’ and ‘assisting’ under section 2(1).93 The Human Tissue Authority have
published guidelines on bone marrow donations from minors but the decision to harvest is
taken in-house without court approval as long as both parents consent.94 This is staggering
considering the lack of judicial precedent. Parents are therefore free in law to create their own
saviour  sibling,  cannot  yet  harvest that  child  in  law,  but  proceed under  the ambit  of the
Human Tissue Authority anyway (figure 1):
Statistics from the Human Tissue Authority (as of January 2015)95
Year Child  bone  marrow/blood
stem cell cases approved
Cases rejected
2007 - 2008 71 0
2008 - 2009 57 0
2009 - 2010 78 0
2010 - 2011 67 0
2011 - 2012 68 0
2012 - 2013 69 0
2013 - 2014 78 0
(Figure 1)
The guidelines published by the Human Tissue Authority now require an urgent rigorous
analysis. In the meantime, should the courts approve a bone marrow harvest upon a child in
the near future, their interpretation of the law of welfare should be very interesting.
93 Quintavalle v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (and Secretary of State for Health) [2005] 2 
A.C. 561].
94 Code of Practice 6: Donation of Allogeneic Bone Marrow and Peripheral Blood Stem Cells for 
Transplantation. (2014). Human Tissue Authority. www.hta.gov.uk, at paragraphs 107 and 108.
95 These statistics were requested from the Human Tissue Authority by the writer under the Data Protection Act 
in January 2015 and delivered via email.
